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Moon in Europe

 

President Moon¡¯s message in Europe looks confused, unfocused, and not persuasive to EU leaders. This is unfortunate, but not surprising. Having embraced CVID and maximum pressure, Moon is trying to change the underpinnings of NK engagement. Europeans have been lobbied hard by the US for 17 years, and some of them are conservative-led. Their embrace of bad history, bad strategy and bad politics surrounding the Korea issue is deeply ingrained. Against this, they needed to be told what to do and why. Not asked, told. It would also be clear to them that Moon did not have the nerve to make his case publicly to Trump or US audiences, but he expects the Europeans to act against Trump¡¯s and Washington¡¯s interests. They would not.

 

¹®´ëÅë·ÉÀÇ À¯·´¹æ¹® Æò°¡

 

À¯·´¿¡¼­ÀÇ ¹®´ëÅë·ÉÀÇ ¸Þ½ÃÁö´Â EUÁ¤Ä¡ ÁöµµÀڵ鿡°Ô È¥¶õ½º·´°í ÃÊÁ¡ÀÌ ¸íÈ®ÇÏÁö ¾Ê¾Æ ¼³µæ·ÂÀÌ ¶³¾îÁø °ÍÀ¸·Î ÆǴܵȴÙ. ÀÌ´Â ¾ÈŸ±î¿î ÀÏÀÌÁö¸¸ ³î¶ö¸¸ÇÑ ÀÏÀº ¾Æ´Ï´Ù. ¹®´ëÅë·ÉÀº ºÎ½ÃÁ¤±Ç ÀÌÈÄ ÀÏ°üµÈ ¹Ì±¹ÀÇ ¡®ÀÔÁõ°¡´ÉÇÏ¸ç ¿ÏÀüÇÏ°í ÃÖÁ¾ÀûÀÎ ºÏÇÙÆó±â Á¤Ã¥(CVID)°ú ÃÖ´ë ¾Ð¹ÚÀ̶ó´Â Æ®·³ÇÁ Á¤ºÎÀÇ ºÏÇÑ¿¡ ´ëÇÑ ÀÔÀåÀ» ¼ö¿ëÇϸ鼭 µ¿½Ã¿¡ ºÏÇÑ¿¡ ´ëÇÑ Æ÷¿ëÁ¤Ã¥À¸·Î ¹æÇâÀ» ¹Ù²Ù·Á ÇÏ°í ÀÖ´Ù. ±×·¯³ª À¯·´ÀεéÀº 17³â°£ ¹Ì±¹ÀÇ ·Îºñ¿¡ ÈֵѷÁ ¿ÔÀ¸¸ç, ±× Áß ¸î¸îÀº ¸Å¿ì º¸¼öÀû ÀÔÀåÀ» °ßÁö(̱ò¥)ÇÑ´Ù. Çѱ¹¹®Á¦¸¦ ´ëÇØ À¯·´ÀεéÀÌ °¡Áö°í ÀÖ´Â À߸øµÈ ¿ª»çÀνÄ, À߸øµÈ Àü·«, À߸øµÈ Á¤Ä¡´Â ¿ª»çÀû »Ñ¸®°¡ ¸Å¿ì ±í´Ù. ÀÌ¿¡ ´ëÀÀÇÏ¿©, ¹®´ëÅë·ÉÀº ±×µé¿¡°Ô ¿Ö ¹«¾ùÀ» ÇØ¾ß Çϴ°¡¿¡ ´ëÇؼ­ ¸í¹éÇÑ ÀÔÀåÀ» ºÐ¸íÈ÷ ¹àÇû¾î¾ß Çß´Ù. ±×µéÀÌ ¿äûÇÏÁö ¾Ê¾Ò¾îµµ ´ÜÈ£È÷ À̾߱âÇß¾î¾ß Çß´Ù. À¯·´ÀεéÀº ¹®´ëÅë·ÉÀÌ Æ®·³ÇÁ³ª ¹Ì±¹ÀÇ Ã»Áß ¾Õ¿¡¼­ °ø°³ÀûÀ¸·Î ÀÌ ¹®Á¦¸¦ ¸»ÇÒ ´ã·ÂÀ» °¡Áö°í ÀÖÁö ¸øÇß´Ù°í ÆÇ´ÜÇÏÁö¸¸, ±×·³¿¡µµ ¹®´ëÅë·ÉÀº À¯·´ÀεéÀÌ Æ®·³ÇÁ¿Í ¿ö½ÌÅÏÀÇ ÀÌÇØ¿¡ ¹ÝÇÏ¿© ÇൿÇϱ⸦ ±â´ëÇÏ¿´´Ù. ¹°·Ð ±×µéÀº ±×·¸°Ô ÇÏÁö ¾Ê´Â´Ù.

 

The European trip repeats some of the same mistakes made at the UNGA in September. There too, SK¡¯s message was unclear and contradictory. At the Council on Foreign Relations event at that time, it should have been clear that no one understood how this engagement was supposed to happen. Even UN Secretary-General Gutierrez is too scared of the Trump administration to say one word in support of President Moon¡¯s suggestion.

 

À̹ø À¯·´ ¹æ¹®ÀÇ »óȲó·³ ÀÌ¹Ì Áö³­ 9¿ùÀÇ ±¹Á¦¿¬ÇÕÃÑȸ¿¡¼­µµ °°Àº ½Ç¼ö°¡ µÇÇ®À̵Ǿú´Ù. ±×°÷¿¡¼­µµ Çѱ¹ÀÇ ¸Þ½ÃÁö´Â ºÒ¸íÈ®Çß°í ¸ð¼øÀûÀ̾ú´Ù. ´ç½Ã ¿Ü±³°ü°è À§¿øȸ¿¡¼­´Â, ±× ´©±¸µµ ºÏÇÑ¿¡ ´ëÇÑ Æ÷¿ëÁ¤Ã¥ÀÌ ¾î¶»°Ô °¡´ÉÇÏ°Ô µÉÁö ¸í¹éÈ÷ ÀÌÇØÇÏ°í ÀÖÁö ¸øÇßÀ½¿¡ Ʋ¸²¾ø´Ù. ½ÉÁö¾î ±¸Å×ÇìÁî(Gutierrez) À¯¿£ »ç¹«ÃÑÀ帶Àúµµ Æ®·³ÇÁ ÇàÁ¤ºÎ¸¦ µÎ·Á¿öÇÑ ³ª¸ÓÁö ¹®´ëÅë·ÉÀÇ Á¦¾È¿¡ ´ëÇØ ´Ü ÇѸ¶µðÀÇ ÁöÁö¹ß¾ðµµ ¸øÇÑ °ÍÀÌ´Ù.

 

The position the president found himself in was humiliating, and completely unnecessary. If we step back, let¡¯s look at what was going on. SK¡¯s president was seeking support from fellow middle power democracies (France and UK) and other members of Europe. They have every reason to support SK and to support SK-NK engagement. South Korea¡¯s economic, diplomatic and soft power here are substantial, and they could have been brought to bear. South Korea is the one party to whom this matters most. It has taken the lead for over nine months on terribly difficult multilateral diplomacy, engaging both the US and the three non-democracies in the Northeast Asian neighborhood, NK, China and Russia.

 

¹®´ëÅë·ÉÀÌ Ã³ÇÑ ÀÔÀåÀº ´ë´ÜÈ÷ ±¼¿åÀû(ÏÝé´îÜ)ÀÌ°í ¿ÏÀüÈ÷ ºñÈ¿°úÀûÀÎ °ÍÀ̾ú´Ù. ÇÑ¹ß ¹°·¯¼­, ¹«¾ùÀÌ ¹ú¾îÁö°í ÀÖ´ÂÁö ÁÖ½ÃÇغ¸ÀÚ. ¹®´ëÅë·ÉÀº ¹ÌµéÆÄ¿ö¸¦ Áö´Ñ ÇÁ¶û½º³ª ¿µ±¹ °°Àº ¹ÎÁÖÁÖÀÇ ±¹°¡ ¹× ±âŸ À¯·´ ±¹°¡µé·ÎºÎÅÍ ÁöÁö¸¦ ±¸ÇÏ°í ÀÖ´Ù. ÀÌµé ±¹°¡µéÀº Çѱ¹ÀÇ ºÏÇÑ¿¡ ´ëÇÑ Æ÷¿ëÁ¤Ã¥À» ÁöÁöÇÒ ¸¹Àº ÀÌÀ¯¸¦ °¡Áö°í ÀÖ´Ù. À¯·´¿¡ ¹ÌÄ¡´Â ³²ÇÑÀÇ °æÁ¦Àû ¿Ü±³Àû ±×¸®°í ¼ÒÇÁÆ®¿þ¾îÀÇ ´É·ÂÀº »ó´çÇϸç, ÀÌ¿¡ »óÀÀÇÏ°Ô ÀÌµé ±¹°¡µé¿¡°Ôµµ ¿µÇâ·ÂÀ» ¹ßÈÖÇÒ ¼ö ÀÖ¾ú´Ù. Çѱ¹Àº ºÏÇÑ¿¡ ´ëÇÑ ¹®Á¦¿¡¼­ °¡Àå Áß¿äÇÑ ´ç»çÀÚÀÌ´Ù. Çѱ¹Àº Áö³­ 9°³¿ù µ¿¾È ¹Ì±¹ ±×¸®°í ºÏÇÑ°ú Áß±¹ ·¯½Ã¾Æ¶ó´Â µ¿ºÏ¾ÆÀÇ »çȸÁÖÀDZ¹°¡ 3±¹°ú ÇÔ²² Çè³­Çϱâ ¦ÀÌ ¾ø´Â ´ÙÀÚ°£ ¿Ü±³¸¦ ÁÖµµÀûÀ¸·Î Àß À̲ø¾î ¿Ô´Ù.

 

For SK now, and for Moon¡¯s presidency, these months are defining. This means everything. Both the leaders and the public in North Korea are expecting a lifting of sanctions. China, Russia and Japan will come to South Korea with new respect and flexibility when sanctions begin to be lifted. Only Moon can push this to happen. Trump won¡¯t do it, and he would fail if he tried. Bolton, Pompeo and the rest of the USG are opposed to any lifting of sanctions.

 

³²ÇÑÀÇ ÀÔÀå¿¡¼­, ÇöÀç ¹®´ëÅë·ÉÀÇ ÀÓ±â ÇÏ¿¡¼­ ÇâÈÄ ¸î ´Þ°£ÀÌ °áÁ¤ÀûÀÌ´Ù. Á¦ÇÑµÈ ½Ã°£Ç¥¿¡ ¸ðµç °ÍÀÌ °É·ÁÀÖ´Ù. ºÏÇÑÀÇ ÁöµµÀÚ¿Í ÀιΠ¸ðµÎ´Â Á¦ÀçÀÇ ÇØÁ¦¸¦ Çмö°í´ë(ùÍâÏÍÈÓâ)ÇÏ°í ÀÖ´Ù. Áß±¹°ú ·¯½Ã¾Æ ÀϺ»Àº ºÏÇÑÀÇ Á¦Àç°¡ ÇØÁ¦µÈ´Ù¸é ³²ÇÑÀ» »õ·Î¿î ½Ã°¢¿¡¼­ Á¸°æÇÏ°Ô µÉ °ÍÀÌ´Ù. ¿ÀÁ÷ ¹®´ëÅë·É¸¸ À̸¦ °¡´ÉÇÏ°Ô ÇÒ ¼ö ÀÖ´Ù. Æ®·³ÇÁ´Â À̸¦ ÇÏ·Á°í ÇÏÁö ¾ÊÀ» °ÍÀÌ¸ç ¸¸¾à ÇÏ·Á°í ÇÑ´Ù Çصµ ½ÇÆÐÇÒ °ÍÀÌ´Ù. º¼Æ°À̳ª ÆûÆäÀÌ¿À ±×¸®°í ¹Ì±¹ Á¤ºÎÀÇ ´Ù¸¥ ÀλçµéÀº Á¦ÀçÀÇ ÇØÁ¦¿¡ ¹Ý´ëÇÏ°í ÀÖ´Ù.

 

Strategy needs to be rethought

This shows that it was a mistake to expect that Moon and Kim could ¡°convince¡± Trump to either get out of the way or play a supporting role. He will instead claim credit for creating a fake crisis and then ¡°solving¡± it. He does not have the bureaucratic power, let alone the insight or understanding, to push the USG which has been reinforced in the wisdom of extreme sanctions and mythically wrong strategic understandings for 17 years to change course and return to Clinton era understandings of US interests. Remember, Clinton had control of his government and some of the Congress, and he was able to advance the last Democrat foreign policy Washington had.

 

Àü·«Àº Àç°í(î¢ÍÅ)µÇ¾î¾ß ÇÑ´Ù.

 

ÀÌ´Â ¹®´ëÅë·É°ú ±èÀ§¿øÀåÀÌ Æ®·³ÇÁ¸¦ ÆÇ¿¡¼­ ¹èÁ¦ÇѴٵ簡 ȤÀº ÁöÁöÇÏ´Â ¿ªÇÒÀ» Çϵµ·Ï ¡°¼³µæ½ÃŲ´Ù¡±´Â °ÍÀº ±â´ëÇÒ ¼ö ¾ø´Â ¼±ÅÃÁöÀÓÀ» º¸¿©ÁØ´Ù. ´ë½Å Æ®·³ÇÁ´Â °¡Â¥ À§±â¸¦ ¸¸µé¾î ³»°í ¶Ç ±×°ÍÀ» ¡°ÇØ°áÇß´Ù°í ¸»Çϸ鼭¡± ÀÚ½ÅÀÇ °øÀ» ÁÖÀåÇÒ °ÍÀÌ´Ù. Æ®·³ÇÁ´Â, °³ÀÎÀû ÅëÂûÀ̳ª ÀÌÇØ·ÂÀ¸·Î, ¹Ì±¹ Á¤ºÎ°¡ Ãß±¸Çß´ø Áö³­ 17³â °£ÀÇ ±Ø´ÜÀûÀÎ Á¦Àç¿Í À߸øµÈ Àü·«Àû ¼±ÅÃÁöµéÀ» Ŭ¸°ÅÏ ½Ã´ëó·³ ¹æÇâÀ» ¹Ù²Ù¾î ¹Ì±¹ÀÇ ÀÌÇØ°ü°èµéÀ» Á¦´ë·Î ÀÌÇؽÃų ¸¸Å­ µÇµ¹¸± ¸¸ÇÑ ¾î¶°ÇÑ °ü·áÁ¦Àû Èûµµ °¡Áö°í ÀÖÁö ¾Ê´Ù. ±â¾ïÇϴ°¡? Ŭ¸°ÅÏÀº ÀÚ½ÅÀÇ Á¤ºÎ¿Í ÀÇȸÀÇ ÇÙ½ÉÀ» ÅëÁ¦ÇÒ ¼ö ÀÖ¾ú°í ¿ö½ÌÅÏÀÌ Á¤ÇÑ ¿Ü±³Á¤Ã¥À» ¹ÎÁÖ´çÀÇ ÃÖÀü¼±±îÁö ¹Ð°í ³ª°¥ ¼ö ÀÖ¾ú´Ù.

 

Despite Trump¡¯s personal opening, the US government is retrenching into its extreme Republican view of international affairs, in which there is no room for a successful agreement with North Korea, and US diplomacy is reduced to bullying and threatening. Bolton has been unleashed.

 

Æ®·³ÇÁÀÇ °³ÀÎÀûÀÎ °³¹æ¼º¿¡µµ ºÒ±¸ÇÏ°í, ¹Ì±¹ Á¤ºÎ´Â ±¹Á¦¹®Á¦¿¡¼­ ±Ø´ÜÀûÀÎ °øÈ­´çÀû °üÁ¡À» °ßÁöÇÏ°í ÀÖ´Ù. ¿©±â¿¡¼­´Â ºÏÇÑ°ú ÇÕÀÇÇÒ ¿©Áö¸¦ ¹ß°ßÇϱ⠾î·Á¿ì¸ç, °á°úÀûÀ¸·Î ¹Ì±¹ÀÇ ¿Ü±³´Â ºÏÇÑ¿¡ ´ëÇÑ ÀÌÁö¸Þ¿Í Çù¹Ú ÀÌ»óµµ ÀÌÇϵµ ¾Æ´Ñ °ÍÀÌ µÇ¾î ¹ö·È´Ù. ±× °á°ú º¼Æ°(Bolton)Àº ¸Ú´ë·Î ÇൿÇÏ°Ô µÇ¾ú´Ù.

 

Despite the Blue House¡¯s reluctance to act as a middle power and to use its assets in this case, it can still lead the US, Europe and others to either support its efforts or stand aside.

 

ºñ·Ï û¿Í´ë´Â ¹ÌµéÆÄ¿ö·Î¼­ ¿ªÇÒÀ» Çϸ鼭 ÀÚ½ÅÀÇ ÀÚ»êÀ» °ú½Ã(ΣãÆ)Çϱ⸦ ÁÖÀúÇÏ°í ÀÖÀ¸³ª, ¹Ì±¹°ú À¯·´ ±×¸®°í ´Ù¸¥ ³ª¶óµéÀÌ Çѱ¹À» ÁöÁöÇÏ°Ô Çϰųª ¾Æ´Ï¸é ÁöÄѺ¸°Ô ÇÏ´Â ½ÄÀ¸·Î À¯µµÇÒ ¼ö´Â ÀÖ´Ù.

 

Sanctions have finally been recognized as the key to any progress

I have been arguing this point for almost two years. The centrality of sanctions should have been clear before then. President Moon and his advisors should have made the lifting of specific sanctions in return for specific NK actions as central part of their governing position. They then could have made this a central part of their public and private points to Trump and his administration. We will never know, but this may have worked under NSC Advisor McMaster.

 

¸¶Ä§³» Á¦Àç´Â »çÅÂÀÇ ÁøÀüÀ» À§ÇÑ ÁÖµÈ ¿­¼è°¡ µÇ°í ÀÖ´Ù

 

³ª´Â ÀÌ Á¡¿¡ ´ëÇØ °ÅÀÇ 2³â°£ ÁÙ°ð ÁÖÀåÇØ ¿Ô´Ù. ÀÌÀüºÎÅÍ ºÏÇÑ Á¦ÀçÀÇ Á߿伺Àº ¸íÈ®ÇÑ °ÍÀ̾ú´Ù. ¹®´ëÅë·É°ú ÁÖº¯ Á¶¾ðÀÚµéÀº, ºÏÇÑÀÇ Æ¯Á¤ÇàÀ§¿¡ ´ëÇÑ ´ë°¡·Î ƯÁ¤Á¦ÀçÀÇ ÇØÁ¦¸¦ ÅëÇØ ÀڽŵéÀÇ Á¤Ä¡Àû Áß¿äÇÑ À§Ä¡¸¦ È®º¸Çß¾î¾ß Çß´Ù. ¾Æ¿ï·¯ À̸¦ ÅëÇØ Æ®·³ÇÁ¿Í ¹Ì±¹ÇàÁ¤ºÎ¿¡°Ô »çÀûÀÎ ³»¿ëÀ» Æ÷ÇÔÇÏ¿© ÁÖ¿äÇÑ °øÀûÀÎ ¼º°úÀÇ ÀϺημ­ Á¦°øÇß¾î¾ß Çß´Ù. Á¤È®È÷ ¾Ë ¼ö´Â ¾ø°ÚÁö¸¸, ÀÌ·± ÀÏÀº ¾Æ¸¶µµ ¹Ì±¹ÀÇ ±¹°¡¾ÈÀü º¸ÀåȸÀÇ(NSC)ÀÇ Àü º¸Á°ü ¸Æ¸Å½ºÅÍ(McMaster)ÀÇ ¿ëÀÎ ÇÏ¿¡¼­ ¹ú¾îÁú ¼öµµ ÀÖ¾ú´Ù.

 

Instead, Moon embraced both ¡°CVID¡± and ¡°maximum pressure¡± by the US, as well as the lie that maximum pressure ¡°brought NK to the table.¡± He did this at the beginning of his presidency, at a time when he did not have to do any of it. All three positions are wrong, all three are counterproductive, and all three limit and impede South Korea¡¯s diplomatic flexibility and its ability to have a cohesive message. It would have been possible to be supportive of the US while keeping clear of these three strategic dead ends.

 

±×·¸°Ô ÇÏ´Â ´ë½Å, ¹®´ëÅë·ÉÀº Æ®·³ÇÁ ÇàÁ¤ºÎÀÇ ¡°ÃÖ´ë¾Ð¹Ú¡±ÀÌ ¡°ºÏÇÑÀ» Çù»óÅ×À̺í·Î ºÒ·¶´Ù¡±´Â °ÅÁþ¸»À» ¿ëÀÎÇϸ鼭, ¹Ì±¹ÀÇ ¡®ºÏÇÙÆó±âÁ¤Ã¥¡¯°ú ¡®ÃÖ´ë¾Ð¹Ú¡¯À» ¼ö¿ëÇÏ¿´´Ù. ¹®´ëÅë·ÉÀº ±×·² ÇÊ¿ä°¡ ÀüÇô ¾ø¾ú´ø ÀÓ±â ÃʺÎÅÍ ±×·¸°Ô Çß´Ù. ÀÌ·¯ÇÑ ¹è°æÀº ¸ðµÎ ºñ»ý»êÀûÀÌ°í À߸øµÈ ÀÔÀåÀ¸·Î¼­, Çѱ¹ÀÇ ¿Ü±³Àû À¯¿¬¼º°ú ÀÏ°ü¼ºÀ» Á¦ÇÑÇÏ°í ¾î·Á¿òÀ» °Þ°Ô ÇÏ¿´´Ù. À§¿¡ ¾ð±ÞÇÑ À߸øµÈ ÀνÄÀ» ºÒ½ÄÇϸ鼭 ¹Ì±¹¿¡°Ôµµ µµ¿òÀ» ÁÙ ¼ö ÀÖ´Â ±âȸ¸¦ ÀÒ¾ú´Ù.

 

 

The big breakthrough

 

Considering what has been happening during the past weeks, there appears to be one initiative that could break the logjam of diplomacy. In order for it to work, however, the Blue House and the entire government must be clear about their plan, be well-briefed on it, and have a good and realistic ¡°Plan B.¡±

 

µ¹Æı¸¸¦ ã¾Æ¼­

 

°ú°Å ¸î ÁÖ µ¿¾È ¹«½¼ ÀÏÀÌ ÀÖ¾ú´ÂÁö »ý°¢Çغ¸¸é, ¿Ü±³Àû ±³Âø(Îïó·)À» ŸÆÄÇϱâ À§ÇÑ ÇÑ°¡Áö Ÿ°³Ã¥ÀÌ ÀÖÀ» µí ÇÏ´Ù. ±×·¯³ª ÀÌ°ÍÀÌ ÀÛµ¿Çϵµ·Ï Çϱâ À§Çؼ­´Â, û¿Í´ë¿Í Çѱ¹ Á¤ºÎ´Â ÃæºÐÈ÷ °ËÅäÇÏ¿© Àß ÁغñµÈ ±×¸®°í Çö½ÇÀûÀÌ¸ç ¸íÈ®ÇÑ ¡®Ç÷£ B¡¯¸¦ °¡Áú ¼ö ÀÖ¾î¾ß ÇÑ´Ù.

 

Factors to consider

Trump does not, and cannot control his government. This means that agreements with him at Singapore and at a future summit are unlikely to be implemented, even if he wants them to be.

 

°í·ÁÇØ¾ß ÇÒ º¯¼öµé

 

Æ®·³ÇÁ´Â Á¤ºÎ¸¦ ÅëÁ¦ÇÒ ¼öµµ ¾ø°í ÇÏÁöµµ ¾Ê´Â´Ù. ÀÌ°ÍÀÌ ÀǹÌÇÏ´Â °ÍÀº ½Ì°¡Æ÷¸£ ÇÕÀǶóµç°¡ ÇâÈÄ Á¤»óȸ´ãÀÇ ¾î¶² ÇÕÀǵµ, ¼³»ç ±×°¡ ÀÌÇàÇÏ·Á°í ÇÑ´Ù ÇÏ´õ¶óµµ, ÀÌÇàµÉ °¡´É¼ºÀÌ ³·´Ù´Â °ÍÀ» ÀǹÌÇÑ´Ù.

 

This means two things. First, it is pointless to keep reminding Trump and others what Trump agreed to in Singapore or elsewhere. Trump feels he has won, since there are no NK missile launches and no NK nuclear weapons tests.

 

ÀÌ°ÍÀÌ ÀǹÌÇÏ´Â °ÍÀº µÎ °¡Áö ÀÌ´Ù. ù°´Â Æ®·³ÇÁ¿Í ÁÖº¯Àε鿡°Ô ½Ì°¡Æ÷¸£ ÇÕÀÇ°¡ ¹«¾ùÀ̾ú´ÂÁö »ó±â½ÃÅ°´Â °ÍÀº ¹«ÀǹÌÇÏ´Ù´Â °ÍÀÌ´Ù. Æ®·³ÇÁ´Â ¿À·£ ±â°£ ºÏÇÑÀÇ ¹Ì»çÀÏ ¹ß»ç³ª ÇÙ¹«±â ½ÇÇèÀÌ ¾ø±â ¶§¹®ÀÌ ÀÚ½ÅÀÌ ÀÌ°å´Ù°í ´À³¢°í ÀÖ´Ù.

 

The second meaning of Trump¡¯s inability to control his government is that SK strategy should be to lead them, and bracket them, into a position where they will either support Moon¡¯s initiative or stand aside.

 

Æ®·³ÇÁ°¡ ÇàÁ¤ºÎ¸¦ Àå¾ÇÇÏÁö ¸øÇÑ´Ù´Â »ç½ÇÀÌ ÀǹÌÇÏ´Â µÎ ¹ø° Á¡Àº Çѱ¹ÀÇ Àü·«À¸·Î ¹Ì±¹ÀÌ ¹®´ëÅë·ÉÀÇ ÀÔÀåÀ» ÁöÁöÇϰųª ȤÀº ÁöÄѺ¸µµ·Ï À¯µµÇÏ°í °ü¸ÁÇϵµ·Ï ¹­¾îµÎ¾î¾ß ÇÑ´Ù´Â Á¡ÀÌ´Ù.

 

 

Kim Jung Un seems to be coming to understand that Trump cannot keep his promises, even if he is sincere. It is now entirely possible that Kim and Moon could engineer the destruction of Yongbyon, the provision of an initial list of NK assets, and the introduction of inspectors to NK, and still not get reciprocal actions from the USG.

 

±èÁ¤ÀºÀº Æ®·³ÇÁ ÀÚ½ÅÀÌ ¼º½ÇÇÏ°Ô ÀÓÇÑ´Ù ÇÏ´õ¶óµµ ±×°¡ ¾à¼ÓÀ» Áöų ¼ö ¾ø´Ù´Â °ÍÀ» °ð ¾Ë°Ô µÉ °ÍÀÌ´Ù. ¹®´ëÅë·É°ú ±èÀ§¿øÀåÀº Áö±Ý ´çÀåÀÌ¶óµµ ÇÕÀÇÇÏ¿© ¿µº¯½Ã¼³ÀÇ ÇØü, ºÏÇÑÀÇ ÇÙ ½Ã¼³¿¡ ´ëÇÑ ÀÏÂ÷º¸°í¼­ Á¦°ø, Á¶»ç°üÀÇ ½ÇÇà Âø¼ö¸¦ ÁøÇàÇÒ ¼ö ÀÖÀ¸³ª, ÀÌ¿¡ ´ëÇØ ¹Ì±¹Á¤ºÎ·ÎºÎÅÍ ¾î¶°ÇÑ ÀÔÀåµµ È®ÀÎÀ» ¹ÞÀº ¹Ù ¾ø´Ù.

 

Therefore, he has several options. His best option is to use the Trump/Moon years as best he can, since he cannot expect progressive or smart presidents in Washington or Seoul after they are gone. That may happen, but Kim would be foolish to expect it. These two to three years are all-important to both Koreas. They must change history.

 

µû¶ó¼­ ±èÀ§¿øÀå¿¡°Ô´Â ¸î °¡Áö ¼±ÅÃÁö°¡ ÀÖ´Ù. °¡Àå ÃÖ¼±ÀÇ ¼±ÅÃÁö´Â Æ®·³ÇÁ/¹®ÀÇ ÀçÀӱⰣÀ» ÃÖ´ëÇÑ È°¿ëÇÏ´Â °ÍÀε¥, ¿Ö³ÄÇϸé ÀÌÈķδ ¿ö½ÌÅÏÀ̳ª ¼­¿ï·ÎºÎÅÍ Áøº¸ÀûÀÌ°í Çö¸íÇÑ ´ëÅë·ÉÀ» ±â´ëÇϱ⠾î·Æ±â ¶§¹®ÀÌ´Ù. ¹°·Ð ÀÖÀ» ¼öµµ ÀÖ°ÚÀ¸³ª, ÀÌ°ÍÀ» ±â´ëÇÑ´Ù¸é ±èÀ§¿øÀåÀÌ ¾î¸®¼®Àº °ÍÀÌ´Ù. ÇâÈÄ 2-3³âÀÌ ³²ºÏÇÑ ¸ðµÎ¿¡°Ô ´ë´ÜÈ÷ Áß¿äÇÏ´Ù. ³²ºÏÇÑÀÌ ¿ª»ç¸¦ ¹Ù²Ù¾î¾ß ÇÑ´Ù.

 

In order to use the Trump/Moon years, Kim may have to give to Moon what he was willing to give to Trump. Give it to Moon to strengthen Moon¡¯s hand to lift some UN sanctions. Moon can give it to the UN or to Trump, but specific sanctions must be lifted.

 

Æ®·³ÇÁ¿Í/¹®ÀÇ ÀçÀӱⰣÀ» È°¿ëÇϱâ À§Çؼ­´Â, ±èÀ§¿øÀåÀº Æ®·³ÇÁ¿¡°Ô ÁÖ·Á°í Çß´ø °ÍÀ» ¹®´ëÅë·É¿¡°Ô ÁÙ ¼ö ÀÖ´Ù. ¹®´ëÅë·É¿¡°Ô °Ç³Ù´Ù¸é ¹®´ëÅë·É¿¡°Ô ÈûÀ» ½Ç¾îÁÖ´Â ÀÏÀÌ µÉ °ÍÀÌ°í °á°úÀûÀ¸·Î ¸î °¡Áö À¯¿£ÀÇ Á¦ÀçÇØÁ¦·Î À̾îÁú ¼ö ÀÖÀ» °ÍÀÌ´Ù. ¹®´ëÅë·ÉÀº ±èÀ§¿øÀåÀ¸·ÎºÎÅÍ ³Ñ°Ü ¹ÞÀº °ÍÀ» À¯¿£À̳ª Æ®·³ÇÁ¿¡°Ô ´Ù½Ã Àü´ÞÇÒ ¼ö ÀÖÀ¸¸ç ¸î¸î Á¦Àç°¡ ÇØÁ¦µÇ¸®¶ó´Â °ÍÀº ¸í¹éÇÏ´Ù.

 

What would Kim give? He would give several things:

 

The dismantlement of Yongbyon, under IAEA and CTBTO inspection.

The public provision of an initial list of nuclear assets, with the clear statement that future lists will be forthcoming, as sanctions are lifted and security and diplomatic connections are established, until all assets are listed. This language is important. ¡°Initial list¡± confirms two things: One, of course the list is incomplete, since NK will not open itself to criticism of it being incomplete. And two, other lists will be coming, depending on US actions.

 

±èÀ§¿øÀåÀÌ ÁÙ ¼ö ÀÖ´Â °ÍÀº ¹«¾ùÀΰ¡? ¾Æ¸¶µµ ´ÙÀ½ ¸î °¡Áö°¡ µÉ °ÍÀÌ´Ù :

 

±¹Á¦¿øÀڷ±ⱸ(IAEA)¿Í Æ÷°ýÇÙ½ÇÇè±ÝÁö±â±¸(CTBTO)ÀÇ °¨Âû ÇÏ¿¡ ¿µº¯½Ã¼³ÀÇ ÇØüÀÌ´Ù.

Á¦Àç°¡ ÇØÁ¦µÇ°í ¾ÈÀü ¹× ¿Ü±³°ü°è°¡ ¼ö¸³µÇ´Â µ¿½Ã¿¡, ÇâÈÄ Çٽü³¿¡ ´ëÇÑ Ãß°¡ ¸®½ºÆ®°¡ ÀÖÀ¸¸®¶ó´Â ¸íÈ®ÇÑ ¼³¸í°ú ÇÔ²², °ð ¸ðµç Çٽü³¿¡ ´ëÇÑ º¸°í°¡ ÀÌ·ç¾îÁú ¶§±îÁö, Çٽü³¿¡ ´ëÇÑ ÀÏÂ÷ º¸°í¼­ÀÇ °ø°³°¡ ÀÌ·ç¾îÁú °ÍÀÌ´Ù. ÀÌ ¶§ÀÇ ¾ð¼ú(åëâû)ÀÌ ¸Å¿ì Áß¿äÇÏ´Ù. ¿Ö³ÄÇÏ¸é ¡®ÃÖÃÊÀÇ º¸°í¼­¡¯´Â µÎ °¡Áö¸¦ È®ÀνÃÄÑ ÁÙ ¼ö Àֱ⠶§¹®ÀÌ´Ù: Çϳª´Â, ºÏÇÑÀº º¸°í¼­°¡ ºÒ¿ÏÀüÇÏ´Ù´Â ºñÆÇ¿¡ Á÷¸éÇÏ·Á ÇÏÁö ¾ÊÀ» °ÍÀ̱⠶§¹®¿¡, ´ç¿¬È÷ º¸°í¼­°¡ ºÒÃæºÐÇϸ®¶ó´Â Á¡ÀÌ´Ù. µÑ°·Î, ÀÌÈÄÀÇ º¸°í¼­´Â ¹Ì±¹ÀÇ Á¶Ä¡¿¡ µû¶ó ´Þ¶óÁú °ÍÀÌ´Ù.

 

IAEA and CTBTO inspectors will be invited to take up residence in NK, as long as denuclearization is proceeding. US inspectors are also welcome, but they cannot substitute for the others.

 

±¹Á¦¿øÀڷ±ⱸ¿Í Æ÷°ýÇÙ½ÇÇè±ÝÁö±â±¸ÀÇ Á¶»ç°üµéÀº ºñÇÙÈ­°¡ ÁøÇàµÇ´Â µ¿¾È ºÏÇÑ¿¡ ¸Ó¹°·¯¾ß ÇÒ °ÍÀÌ´Ù. ¹Ì±¹ÀÇ Á¶»ç°üµéµµ ÇÔ²² ü·ùÇÏ°ÚÁö¸¸, À̵éÀÌ ´Ù¸¥ Á¶»ç°üµéÀ» ´ë½ÅÇÒ ¼ö´Â ¾ø´Ù.

 

A public pledge to continue its ban on missile launches and nuclear tests as long as diplomacy continues, and as long as there is a medium-term agreement on limits to US/SK military exercises. That agreement can be negotiated now.

 

¹Ì±¹/³²ÇÑÀÇ ±º»ç¿¬½ÀÀÇ °üÇÑ Áß´Ü¿¡ ´ëÇÑ Áß±âÀûÀÎ ÇÕÀÇ°¡ ÀÌ·ç¾î Áö°í ¾Æ¿ï·¯ ¿Ü±³Àû ³ë·ÂÀÌ Áö¼ÓµÈ´Ù¸é, ¹Ì»çÀÏÀÇ ¹ß»ç³ª ÇÙ½ÇÇèÀº Áß´ÜÇÑ´Ù´Â °ø°³Àû ¼­¾à¿¡ ´ëÇÑ ÇÕÀÇ´Â Áö±ÝÀÌ¶óµµ Çù»ó °¡´ÉÇÏ´Ù.

 

What sanctions would be lifted?

UN sanctions that relate to SK-NK economic interaction. This would permit feasibility studies, medium- and eventually large-scale infrastructure projects to go forward.

UN sanctions that do not relate directly to hardware or components that could be used in missile or nuclear or WMD weapons.

Any sanctions that would prevent IFIs from initial meetings and visits to begin planning for NK membership.

 

¾î¶°ÇÑ Á¦Àç°¡ ÇØÁ¦µÉ ¼ö ÀÖÀ» °ÍÀΰ¡?

 

³²ÇÑ-ºÏÇÑÀÇ °æÁ¦Àû »óÈ£±³·ù¿¡ °üÇÑ À¯¿£ÀÇ Á¦Àç°¡ Ç®¸± °ÍÀÌ´Ù. Áß´ëÇü ±Ô¸ðÀÇ ÀÎÇÁ¶ó ÇÁ·ÎÁ§Æ®¿¡ ´ëÇÑ »çÀüÁ¶»ç, ¹Ì»çÀÏÀ̳ª Ç٠ȤÀº ´ë·®»ì»ó¹«±â¿¡ Á÷Á¢ »ç¿ëµÇÁö ¾Ê´Â Çϵå¿þ¾î¿Í ºÎÇ°µéÀÇ °Å·¡, ±¹Á¦±ÝÀ¶ ±â±¸(International Financial Institute,IFI)µé¿¡ ´ëÇÑ ºÏÇÑÀÇ °¡ÀÔÀ» ŸÁøÇÏ´Â Ãʱ⠼öÁØÀÇ È¸ÇÕ°ú »óÈ£ ¹æ¹® µîÀÌ °¡´ÉÇÒ °ÍÀÌ´Ù.

 

Moon, too, must use the Trump/Moon years to maximum benefit. Remember, serious specialists here in Washington did not expect Hillary Clinton to improve President Obama¡¯s Korea policy. All signs were that she would be incapable of real engagement. So the Trump years have been a piece of good luck for Moon. And so far Moon has done many very good and remarkable things to take advantage of the Trump era.

 

¹®´ëÅë·Éµµ ÀÌÀÍÀ» ±Ø´ëÈ­Çϱâ À§Çؼ­´Â Æ®·³ÇÁ/¹®ÀÇ ÀçÀӱⰣÀ» ÀÌ¿ëÇØ¾ß ÇÑ´Ù. ÀÌ°÷ ¿ö½ÌÅÏÀÇ ³ë·ÃÇÑ Àü¹®°¡´Â Èú·¯¸® Ŭ¸°ÅÏÀÌ ¿À¹Ù¸¶ÀÇ Çѱ¹Á¤Ã¥À» °³¼±½ÃÅ°¸®¶ó°í ±â´ëÇÑ ÀûÀÌ ¾ø¾ú´Ù´Â °ÍÀ» ±â¾ïÇØÁֱ⠹ٶõ´Ù. ¸ðµç Á¤È²µéÀÌ Èú·¯¸® Ŭ¸°ÅÏÀÌ Á¦´ë·Î µÈ ±³¼·(Îßàï)À» ÇÒ ¼ö ¾ø´Ù´Â °ÍÀ» º¸¿©ÁÖ°í ÀÖ¾ú´Ù. µû¶ó¼­ Æ®·³ÇÁÀÇ ÀçÀӱⰣÀÌ ¹®´ëÅë·É¿¡°Ô´Â ÇÑÁ¶°¢ Çà¿îÀÏ ¼ö ÀÖ´Ù. ±×¸®°í Áö±Ý±îÁö ¹®´ëÅë·ÉÀº ´ë´ÜÈ÷ ÈǸ¢ÇÑ ¶Ù¾î³­ ÀϵéÀ» ÇØ¿ÔÀ¸¸ç, Æ®·³ÇÁ ½Ã´ëÀÇ ÀÕÁ¡À» À̲ø¾î ³¾ ¼ö ÀÖ¾ú´Ù.

 

The SK government could arrange with Kim Jung Un to propose the exchange described above. Full research would be done to determine what exactly is involved in each step, including NK¡¯s actions and UN sanctions removal.

 

³²ÇÑ Á¤ºÎ´Â À§¿¡¼­ ¸»ÇÑ Á¦ÀçÇØÁ¦ÀÇ ±³¼·À» Á¦¾ÈÇϱâ À§ÇØ ±èÁ¤Àº°ú Çù»óÇÒ ¼ö ÀÖ¾î¾ß ÇÑ´Ù. À̸¦ À§Çؼ­ ºÏÇÑÀÇ ÇൿÀ̳ª À¯¿£ÀÇ Á¦ÀçÇØÁ¦ µî °¢ ´Ü°è¿¡¼­ Á¤È®È÷ ¹«¾ùÀÌ ÇÊ¿äÇÑ °¡¿¡ ´ëÇÑ Ã¶ÀúÇÑ ¿¬±¸°¡ ¼ö¹Ý(âËÚá)µÇ¾î¾ß ÇÒ °ÍÀÌ´Ù.

 

Once the details were clear, the deal could be briefed to the US (not submitted for ¡°approval¡± but briefed) and then briefed to the Chinese, Russians, Japanese, Europeans, and others. SK diplomatic approaches would be to describe in detail how states would benefit from the deal, and answer any questions. Then SK would make crystal clear that they ¡°expect full support at the UN¡± and bilaterally. Not ¡°ask¡± but ¡°expect.¡± And finally, ¡°do I have your agreement?¡±

 

ÀÏ´Ü ¼¼ºÎ»çÇ×ÀÌ È®½ÇÇØÁö¸é, ÇÕÀÇ´Â ¹Ì±¹¿¡ ¼³¸íµÇ¾î¾ß ÇÒ °ÍÀÌ°í(¡°Çã¶ô¡±ÀÌ ¾Æ´Ñ ¼³¸íÀÌ´Ù), ±×·± ´ÙÀ½ Áß±¹°ú ·¯½Ã¾Æ ÀϺ» À¯·´ ±× ¿Ü ±¹°¡µé¿¡°Ô ¼³¸íµÇ¾î¾ß ÇÒ °ÍÀÌ´Ù. À̶§ ³²ÇÑÀÇ ¿Ü±³Àû Á¢±ÙÀº ³²ºÏ°£ ÇÕÀǷκÎÅÍ ¾î¶°ÇÑ ÀÌÀÍÀ» ¾òÀ» ¼ö ÀÖÀ»Áö¿¡ ´ëÇØ °¢±¹ ³ª¶ó¸¶´Ù ´øÁö´Â Áú¹®¿¡ ´äÇÒ ¼ö ÀÖÀ» ¸¸Å­ ÀÚ¼¼ÇÑ °ÍÀ̾î¾ß ÇÒ °ÍÀÌ´Ù. ±×·± ÀÌÈÄ¿¡ ³²ÇÑÀº ¡°À¯¿£À¸·ÎºÎÅÍ Àü¸éÀûÀÎ ÁöÁö¸¦ ±â´ëÇÒ ¼ö ÀÖ´ÂÁö ¶Ç À¯¿£ ¿ª½Ã ³²ÇÑÀÇ ¿ªÇÒÀ» ±â´ëÇÒ ¼ö ÀÖ´ÂÁö ¸íÈ®È÷ ÇÒ ¼ö ÀÖÀ» °ÍÀÌ´Ù. ¡°¿äû¡±ÀÌ ¾Æ´Ñ ¡°±â´ë¡±ÀÌ´Ù. ±×¸®°í ¸¶Ä§³», ³²ÇÑÀº ¡°µ¿ÀÇÇØ ÁÖ½Ç ¼ö ÀÖ½À´Ï±î?¡± ¹°À» ¼ö ÀÖ°Ô µÉ °ÍÀÌ´Ù.

 

Finally the deal would be briefed to the UN and some announcement scheduled. The US could either support or stand aside. After the announcement, a schedule of actions would begin, with NK making the first of several moves.

 

³¡À¸·Î ÇÕÀÇ´Â À¯¿£¿¡ º¸°íµÇ°í ¹ßÇ¥µÉ ¼ö ÀÖÀ» °ÍÀÌ´Ù. ¹Ì±¹Àº À̸¦ ÁöÁöÇϰųª ÁöÄѺ¼ °ÍÀÌ´Ù. ¹ßÇ¥°¡ ³¡³ª¸é, ´Ü°èº° ÀÏÁ¤ÀÌ ÀâÈú °ÍÀÌ°í ºÏÇÑÀº ÀÌ¿Í °ü·ÃÇÑ Ã¹ Á¶Ä¡µéÀ» ÃëÇÏ°Ô µÉ °ÍÀÌ´Ù.

 

A note on NK economic policy. It is useful to remember how badly President Kim Dae Jung was served by Chung Ju Young¡¯s last-minute ploy to insert Hyundai into North Korea on favorable terms before other companies. This should make the Blue House determined to have a transparent and fair process for SK investment into NK. It does not need corrupt arrangements to do what is necessary.

 

ºÏÇÑÀÇ °æÁ¦Á¤Ã¥À» À§ÇÑ Á¶¾ð¿¡ °üÇÑ °ÍÀÌ´Ù.

 

±è´ëÁß ´ëÅë·ÉÀÌ, ´Ù¸¥ ±â¾÷µéº¸´Ù À¯¸®ÇÑ Á¶°ÇÀ¸·Î Çö´ë¸¦ ºÏÇÑ¿¡ µéÀÌ°íÀÚ ÇÑ Á¤ÁÖ¿µÀÇ ÃÖÈÄÀÇ °èÃ¥À¸·Î ¾ó¸¶³ª ½ÉÇÑ Áö°æÀ» ´çÇß´ÂÁö ±â¾ïÇÒ ÇÊ¿ä°¡ ÀÖ´Ù. û¿Í´ë´Â ºÏÇÑ¿¡ ´ëÇÑ ³²ÇÑÅõÀÚ°¡ Åõ¸íÇÏ°í °øÁ¤ÇÑ °úÁ¤ÀÌ µÉ ¼ö ÀÖµµ·Ï ÇØ¾ß ÇÒ °ÍÀÌ´Ù. ÇÊ¿äÇÑ ÀÏÀ» Çϴµ¥ ºÎÆÐÇÑ Çù»óÀº ÇÊ¿ä°¡ ¾ø´Ù.

 

The international community, and the US, bungled the collapse of the Soviet Union in December 1991. A shock-therapy, cowboy capitalist environment developed, state assets were looted by oligarchs and politicians, and the public was severely cheated.

 

One lesson for Korea is that the US and international institutions do not know what is best for North Korea. Specific experts and trusted specialists should be brought in now to determine with North Korea some basic ground rules.

 

ÀÏÂïÀÌ ±¹Á¦»çȸ¿Í ¹Ì±¹Àº 1991³â ¼Ò·ÃÀÇ ºØ±«(ÝÚÎÕ)¸¦ ¸ÁÄ£¹Ù ÀÖ´Ù. ÀÏÁ¾ÀÇ ¼îÅ©Ä¡·á ȤÀº Ä«¿ìº¸ÀÌ ÀÚº»ÁÖÀÇ È¯°æÀÌ Á¶¼ºµÇ¾î, ¼Ò·ÃÀÇ ±¹°¡ÀÚ»êÀº °úµÎÁý´Ü(oligarchs)°ú Á¤Ä¡Àο¡ ÀÇÇØ Å»Ãë´çÇßÀ¸¸ç ±¹¹ÎµéÀº ¿ÏÀüÈ÷ ±â¸¸(ѧؾ) ´çÇß´Ù.

 

À̷κÎÅÍ Çѱ¹ÀÌ ¾òÀ» ¼ö ÀÖ´Â ÇÑ°¡Áö ±³ÈÆÀº ¹Ì±¹°ú ±¹Á¦±â±¸´Â ºÏÇÑÀ» À§ÇØ ¹«¾ùÀÌ °¡Àå ÁÁÀº °ÍÀÎÁö ¾ËÁö ¸øÇÑ´Ù´Â Á¡ÀÌ´Ù. ´Ù¾çÇÑ ºÐ¾ßÀÇ ¿ª·®ÀÖ´Â Àü¹®°¡µéÀ» ¸ð¾Æ¾ß Çϸç, À̵éÀÌ ºÏÇÑ°ú ÇÔ²² ±Ùº»ÀûÀÎ ¿øÄ¢µéÀ» µµÃâÇØ ³»¾ß ÇÑ´Ù.

 

Seoul should be much more confident that, working together with the best specialists and taking lessons from modern thinkers, it could together with Pyongyang build a structure that could avoid many of the mistakes of the past two decades of economic policymaking in different economies. Of course many have studied this in recent years, and the SK administration has their own NK economic project, but it badly needs outside, professional advice.

 

Çѱ¹Àº ÃÖ°íÀÇ Àü¹®°¡µé°ú Çù·ÂÇÏ°í ±×µéÀÇ Á¶¾ðÀ» ±¸ÇÏ¿©, Æò¾ç°ú ÇÔ²² ¼­·Î »óÀÌÇÑ µÎ °¡Áö °æÁ¦Ã¼Á¦°£ÀÇ °æÁ¦Á¤Ã¥¿¡ °üÇÑ Áö³­ ÀÌ½Ê ³â°£ÀÇ ½Ç¼ö¸¦ ¹Ýº¹ÇÏÁö ¾ÊÀ» ¼ö ÀÖ´Â ±¸Á¶¸¦ ¼¼¿ï ¼ö ÀÖ¾î¾ß ÇÑ´Ù. ¹°·Ð ÃÖ±Ù ¸¹Àº À̵éÀÌ ÀÌ¿¡ °ü·ÃµÈ ¿¬±¸µéÀ» ÇØ¿ÔÀ¸¸ç ³²ÇÑÁ¤ºÎ ¶ÇÇÑ ÀÚüÀÇ ºÏÇÑ°æÁ¦ ÇÁ·ÎÁ§Æ®¸¦ °¡Áö°í ÀÖÀ¸³ª, ¿ÜºÎÀÇ Àü¹®ÀûÀÎ Á¶¾ð ¶ÇÇÑ ¹Ýµå½Ã ÇÊ¿äÇÏ´Ù°í ÇÒ °Í ÀÌ´Ù.

 

Two points illustrate what is possible. Capacity-building could and should be a central part of all new investments in infrastructure, and in economic structure building. Bradley Babson¡¯s paper is a good start. In addition, all aspects of energy and communications systems should be carefully planned out so that appropriate leapfrogging of technologies can be accomplished.

 

°¡´ÉÇÑ µÎ °¡Áö Á¡À» ¿¹·Î µé ¼ö ÀÖ´Ù. ºÏÇÑÀÇ ¿ª·®°­È­(Capacity-building)°¡ ¸ðµç »õ·Î¿î ÀÎÇÁ¶ó ÅõÀÚ¿Í °æÁ¦±¸Á¶ °Ç¼³ÀÇ Áß½ÉÀû ºÎºÐÀÌ µÇÁö ¾ÊÀ¸¸é ¾ÈµÈ´Ù. ÀÌ¿Í °ü·ÃÇÏ¿© ºê·¡µé¸® ¹ä½¼(Bradley Babson)ÀÇ ³í¹®ÀÌ ÁÁÀº ¿¹½Ã°¡ µÉ ¼ö ÀÖ´Ù. ´õÇؼ­, ÀûÀýÇÑ ±â¼ú¹ßÀüÀÌ ÀÌ·ç¾îÁú ¼ö ÀÖµµ·Ï ¿¡³ÊÁö¿Í Åë½Å ½Ã½ºÅÛÀÌ ÁÖµµ¸é¹Ð(ñ²ÓðØúÚË) ÇÏ°Ô °èȹµÇ¾î¾ß ÇÒ °ÍÀÌ´Ù.

 

 

±Û·Î¹úÀ¥Áø NEWSROH Ä®·³ ¡®ÀÌ·¡°æÀÇ ´Ù¸¥ ¹é³â¡¯

 

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